RENEWABLES 2023 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT

Global Overview

The energy transition must be faster, and include all countries, if we are to meet energy needs and prevent the planet from slipping deeper into climate crisis.

Global Overview

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In 2022, total final energy consumption (TFEC) rose 1% compared to 2021

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In 2021, renewable energy represented 12.6% of TFEC

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Global power sector emissions increased 1.3% in 2022

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Renewable electricity represents 30% of total electricity generation

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Global investment in renewables across the power and fuel supply and infrastructure is below 30%

Module Overview

The year 2022 was a volatile and unpredictable time for energy markets. The rapid economic rebound following the COVID-19 pandemic (although moderate compared to 2021) and the Russian Federation's invasion of Ukraine in February led to further energy price increases. 1 (See Box 1.)

Rising oil and gas prices drove inflation of energy prices (including renewables) and of food and other essentials during the year. 2 To mitigate the inflationary effects, governments implemented policies such as the European Union's (EU) RePowerEU initiative and the US Inflation Reduction Act, which include substantial measures to foster energy efficiency and advance the adoption of renewables. 3

Meanwhile, concerns about climate change were brought to the fore by extreme weather events, ranging from severe floods in Pakistan to extreme heat, drought and fires in China, Europe and the United States. 4 The short-term response of many countries was to increase subsidies for fossil fuels and to burn more coal, leading to the continued dominance of fossil fuels in global energy production and use. 5 Rising prices also slowed progress towards universal access to modern energy services.

The events of 2022 increased worldwide interest in the long-term shift away from fossil fuels to achieve energy and climate security goals. Many countries set new or more ambitious targets and support policies for renewables. At the 2022 United Nations Climate Conference in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt (COP 27), governments were urged to reassess and enhance their emission reduction targets for 2030 in national climate plans, to expedite reductions in coal power and to eliminate inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. 6 Governments emphasised the need to incorporate low-emission and renewable energy to diversify energy sources and systems. 7 Additionally, climate finance was a key topic at COP 27, with the final agreement highlighting the urgency of investing USD 4-6 trillion annually in renewable energy, technology and infrastructure to 2030 to reach net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. 8

Supply chain disruptions and geopolitical shifts have also spurred a greater emphasis on bolstering domestic energy supplies and manufacturing, including for renewable energy technologies and related components and minerals. 9 (See Box 2.)

Access to Electricity and Clean Cooking

In 2021, 754 million people worldwide did not have access to electricity. 10 (See Figure 1.) Rising prices slowed progress towards universal access to modern energy services, and in 2022 the number of people without electricity access was projected to grow by 20 million (mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa), to reach an estimated 774 million. 11 Around 75 million people who recently acquired access to electricity may no longer be able to afford it, and in 2022 around 100 million people were projected to revert to using traditional biomass for cooking, with negative impacts on health and livelihoods. 12

As of 2022, an estimated 2.4 billion people worldwide did not have access to clean cooking facilities, with 40% of them residing in Sub-Saharan Africa and 55% in developing Asia. 13 The number of people using traditional biomass, coal and kerosene for cooking was projected to increase in 2022 due to soaring fuel prices. 14

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Total Final Energy Consumption

The growth in primary energy demand slowed in 2022, rising only 1.1% compared to the 5.5% growth of 2021. 15 Renewables (excluding hydropower) accounted for 7.5% of primary energy (up nearly 1% from 2021), while fossil fuels remained at 82%. 16

The risk of supply disruptions, as well as high fossil fuel price volatility, prompted more energy consumers worldwide to adopt on-site renewable energy systems and to switch to electrified technologies across the end-use sectors.

Between 2011 and 2021, the world's total final energy consumption (TFEC) grew 16%. 17 The amount of modern renewable energy in TFEC increased from 30 exajoules (EJ) in 2011 to 50 EJ in 2021. 18

As the contribution of renewables increased, the share of fossil fuels in TFEC fell from 81.2% in 2011 to 78.9% in 2021; despite the lower share of fossil fuels in TFEC, the overall consumption of fossil fuels increased by 35 EJ during this period. 19 (See Figure 2.)

Iceland continued to have the highest proportion of renewable energy in TFEC in 2020, at 83%, followed by Norway with 74% and Paraguay with 73%. 20 (See Figure 3.) Lao People's Democratic Republic witnessed the largest growth in the renewable energy share in TFEC during 2010-2020 (up 20%), followed by Sweden (19%), Norway (18%) and Denmark (15%). 21

FIGURE 1.

Population without Access to Electricity and Clean Cooking, 2022

 FIGURE 1.

Source: See endnote 10 for this module.

* Estimated value for 2022

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Heat and transport are lagging behind electricity in terms of renewable energy uptake, despite accounting for 77.3% of the global final energy supply.

Heat energy accounted for the largest portion of the world's total final energy supply at 48.7% in 2020, up 4% from 2010 levels. 22 This was followed by transport (liquid and gaseous) fuel (28.6% share) and electricity (22.7%). 23 The uptake of renewables in transport and heating has been low compared to the electricity sector. Renewable heat accounted for just 11.5% of total heat demand in 2020 (excluding traditional biomass accounting for 13.1%), while renewable electricity accounted for an estimated 29.9% of total global electricity production in 2022. 24 Modern bioenergy, solar thermal and geothermal direct heat supplied most of the renewable heat (79%), with the rest from renewable electricity. 25 Biofuels supplied 3.6% of total fuel in the transport sector, while renewable electricity contributed 0.4%. 26

FIGURE 2.

Total Final Energy Consumption by Source, 2011, 2019 and 2021

 FIGURE 2.

Source: See endnote 19 for this module.

Note: Others include nuclear energy and traditional biomass.

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FIGURE 3.

Renewable Share of Total Final Energy Consumption, by Country, 2020

 FIGURE 3.

Source: See endnote 20 for this module.

Note: The top 10 countries with the largest renewable share in TFEC in 2020 were Iceland, Norway, Paraguay, Lao PDR, Sweden, Gabon, Uruguay, Brazil, Finland and Tajikistan. The top 10 countries with the largest increase in renewable share in TFEC (2010-2020) were Lao PDR, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Ecuador, Uruguay, Panama and the United Kingdom.

Energy-related Emissions

Total energy-related greenhouse gas emissions increased 1% in 2022, reaching a record 41.5 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent. 27 (See Figure 4.) However, this was slower growth than the rebound of more than 6% in 2021. 28 Energy combustion and industrial processes contributed 89% of energy-related emissions, which were dominated by CO2. 29 Energy combustion emissions increased by 423 million tonnes, while emissions from industrial processes fell by 102 million tonnes, due mainly to curtailed industrial production, particularly in China (10% decline in cement production and 2% decline in steel manufacturing). 30

Methane emissions from energy combustion, leaks, and venting accounted for 10% of energy-related greenhouse gas emissions, originating mainly from onshore oil and gas operations and steam coal production. 31 Despite the increased cost-effectiveness of methane abatement technologies, methane emissions rose around 2.6% in 2022. 32

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The emission intensity of the power sector in China decreased 2.5% in 2022.

Global power sector emissions rose 1.3% to hit an all-time high in 2022; however, the average carbon intensity i of electricity generation fell to a record low of 436 grams of CO2 per kWh globally. 33 (See Figure 5.) This decline is explained by the significant growth of wind power and solar PV in the global electricity mix. 34 In China, despite the growing demand for electricity, the emission intensity of the power sector decreased notably in 2022, falling 2.5%. 35 The countries with the highest power sector emission intensity during the year were Kosovo, Mongolia and South Africa. 36

FIGURE 4.

Energy Sector Emissions by Source, 2021-2022

 FIGURE 4.

Source: See endnote 27 for this module.

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Electrification and Sector Coupling

The electrification of end-use sectors gained momentum. The share of electricity in total final energy consumption rose from 15.3% in 2010 to 18.9% in 2020. 37 Agriculture was the most electrified sector in 2020, at 26.7%, followed by industry (25.3%) and buildings (23.6%), while transport lagged significantly at only 1.4%. 38 The growing share of electricity in end-use sectors has allowed for greater incorporation of renewable energy sources. 39 In the power sector, newly installed renewable power capacity increased 10% in 2022. 40

In 2022, global electricity demand rose nearly 2.5% despite the impacts of the energy crisis. 41 With more frequent heatwaves, the need for cooling poses additional challenges to rapid electrification, greatly driving up electricity demand ii . 42 In 2022, three countries – Barbados, Cambodia and Nigeria – released National Cooling Action Plans, bringing the total number of countries with such plans to 14, while another 16 countries had plans in process. 43

Electricity is projected to become the dominant energy carrier, accounting for more than 50% of total final energy consumption by 2050, to achieve the global net zero targets. 44 This shift is driven by increased deployment of renewables, improvements in energy efficiency and further electrification of various end-use sectors. 45 Electric car sales surged in major markets in 2022, but the expansion of charging infrastructure needs to be accelerated. 46 Meanwhile, the electrification of buses and heavy-duty vehicles has slowly gained traction, although the market share and model availability are still limited. 47

Heating and cooling technologies, particularly heat pumps, hold promise for electrification in the buildings sector. In 2022, heat pumps grew 11% globally, notably in Europe where they increased 38%. 48 In the United States, annual sales of heat pumps eclipsed fossil gas furnaces for the first time. 49 In the industrial sector, electrification is focused primarily on lower-temperature heat applications, demonstrating slower deployment. An indirect form of electrification is hydrogen, which shows potential in heavy industry. Demonstration projects such as Sweden's Hybrit project have generated widespread interest, particularly in the production of green steel. 50

FIGURE 5.

Power Sector Emissions and Emissions Intensity, 2010-2022

 FIGURE 5.

Source: See endnote 33 for this module.

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Sector coupling presents numerous opportunities for the integration and storage of renewable energy. Excess power generation at off-peak times can be stored to optimise the overall system operations and increase efficiency. 51 This is achieved mainly through linking the power sector with heating/cooling to meet thermal needs, and with transport to charge electric vehicles. However, other applications such as power-to-hydrogen transformations are also being explored. 52

Renewable hydrogen is attracting growing global attention due to a range of potential benefits, including the ability to mitigate curtailment of variable renewable energy technologies, as well as to decarbonise challenging sectors such as transport (road and shipping) and industry (e.g., ammonia), effectively replacing the need for fossil fuels. Nevertheless, by the end of 2021, only around 4% of hydrogen was generated through electrolysis. 53 Renewable energy accounted for an average of around 30% of global electricity production in 2022, indicating that merely 1% of the total hydrogen output was produced using renewable sources. 54

Despite progress in hydrogen production, critical challenges remain, with the lack of infrastructure presenting a major obstacle; this includes pipeline networks, production facilities and fuelling stations. Additionally, the establishment and harmonisation of certification systems are seen as crucial steps towards scaling up the hydrogen economy and fostering global collaboration. 55

In recent years, many countries have adopted national hydrogen strategies to promote its use and development. In 2020, the European Commission adopted the EU Hydrogen Strategy, which emphasises the crucial role of hydrogen in decarbonising various sectors including industry, transport, power generation, and heating, in order to achieve a climate-neutral Europe. 56 By 2020, more than half of European countries had either published their strategies or were in the process of developing them. 57

What is Holding Back the Shift to Renewable Energy?

Planning and permitting barriers are among the greatest challenges for renewable energy projects, resulting in delays at various stages of develop­ment. In the United States, renewable energy generation projects have an average permitting time of 2.7 years, causing many projects to be abandoned due to burdensome delays. 58 Across EU Member States, the duration of permit acquisition can vary greatly, with ground-mounted solar projects typically taking 1–5 years and onshore wind projects ranging from 3 to 9 years. 59

These prolonged timelines, caused by intricate and slow authorisation procedures, have negative consequences such as reduced participation in renewable energy auctions, higher expenses and a decline in the financial viability of power plants. In both Italy and Germany, auctions did not receive enough participants in 2022. 60 To address this issue, the EU released policy recommendations on permitting of renewable projects as part of its REPowerEU Plan. 61 Meanwhile, in China the deployment of renewables is not reported to be greatly affected by administrative processes. 62

A lack of grid capacity has contributed strongly to delays in the deployment of renewable energy technologies. The insufficient investment in grid infrastructure is a global challenge, impacting the growth of new wind and solar PV capacity and the effective use of existing power plants.

China has made significant investments in its grid, averaging USD 75 billion annually since 2010. 63 This has reduced the curtailment of variable renewable energy sources (mainly wind and solar power) from 16% in 2012 to less than 3% in recent years. 64 Contributing factors included improving the interconnection capacity linking provinces in the north and northwest with high-demand load centres in the south and east. 65

In the United States, the interconnection queues for large-scale electric generation and storage projects have grown significantly, with more than 1,400 GW of total capacity seeking connection to the grid as of 2022. 66 The average time that projects spend in the connection queue has increased from 2.1 years in 2010 to 3.7 years in 2021. 67

Estimates indicate that to meet decarbonisation targets, the United States must build transmission infrastructure equivalent to three times the capacity of 2022. 68 However, the lengthy environmental review and permitting processes for long-distance transmission lines impose limitations, often taking 5 to 10 years or more. 69

Some solar and wind power projects have experienced delays caused by supply chain challenges (due to increased demand and disruptions in the supply of materials), volatile raw material prices and shipping delays during 2021-2022. 70 The biomass supply chain also was affected, impacting business continuity and biomass fuel supply, pushing the industry to explore new co-operation opportunities. Supply chain disruptions in the wind industry in India led to delays in project execution and slower-than-expected installation of wind power capacity in 2021. 71 However, most manufacturing plants in Europe managed to continue their operations. 72

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Meeting global targets for net zero carbon emissions and achieving the energy transition requires a significant increase in the production and international trade of critical raw materials. The prices of materials such as polysilicon, aluminium and copper reached record levels in 2022 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, trade tensions, and the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, causing supply chain challenges. 73 Nevertheless, material prices started to fall by the end of 2022. 74

Building societal support for renewable energy projects requires genuine consultation in developing targets, policies and programmes. 75 Additionally, raising awareness and education about the benefits of renewables – including job creation, inclusion, improved health, energy security and financial reward – can minimise opposition to projects. 76 Societal opposition can arise from a variety of drivers including political ideology, views about climate science or economic growth, poor social safeguards and heightened environmental risks of projects. 77

Electricity

In 2022, total electricity generation worldwide increased 2.3% to reach 29,165 terawatt-hours (TWh), a growth rate close to pre-COVID levels and below the 6.2% rebound of 2021. 78 Renewable energy sources contributed 92% of the increase, while the rest was covered mainly by nuclear, fossil gas and coal. 79 Electricity generation from nuclear power declined 0.7% and from oil fell 4.4%. 80 By comparison, in 2021 the increase in electricity generation was covered mainly by coal, fossil gas, and nuclear power sources (a combined 64%), whereas renewables (excluding hydropower) accounted for only 32% of this growth. 81

The growth in electricity demand has not been uniform across the world, with China accounting for 54% of the global increase in 2022, whereas electricity demand in Europe fell 2.5% (by 136.5 TWh); this included declines of 27.5% in Ukraine, 15.3% in Slovenia and 14.5% in Latvia. 82 India had the highest growth in electricity demand globally at 8.4%. 83

Wind power and solar PV's combined share of total installed generation capacity increased 2.4 percentage points in 2022.

Overall, the renewable share in global electricity generation increased 8.1% in 2022, to reach 29.9%. 84 The combined share of wind and solar power in the global electricity generation mix was 12%, continuing a steady increase since 2015. 85 Corporate power purchases have played a growing role in the rising worldwide demand for renewables. 86 (See Sidebar 1.)

In 2022, the world's total power generation capacity (from all sources) grew 4.1%, similar to the growth in 2021. 87 The energy transition towards renewables has focused mainly on a handful of technologies in the power sector. Wind and solar power accounted for 23.9% of the total installed generation capacity in 2022, 2.4 percentage points above 2021 levels. 88 The installed capacity of solar power reached 1,185 GW and wind power 906 GW. 89

Overall, renewable energy has demonstrated resilience despite the rise in renewable power prices in major global markets due to supply chain challenges, construction delays, higher costs of raw materials, parts and labour, as well as inflation, higher interest rates and interconnection delays. 90

Solar PV accounted for 70% of the total capacity additions of renewable power (348 GW) in 2022, followed by wind power 77 GW (22%) and hydropower 22 GW (6.3%). 91 The top three countries with the highest capacity additions of solar and wind power were China, the United States and India. 92

Solar capacity additions reached 243 GW (up around 37% compared to 2021), 44% of which was installed in China, while the United States and India each had 8% shares. 93 Wind power capacity additions totalled 77 GW (down around 17% compared to 2021), with 47.7% installed in China and 15.6% in the United States. 94 Hydropower capacity additions were 22 GW in 2022, well below the estimated 30 GW needed annually to keep temperature below 2 degrees Celsius in 2050. 95 (See GSR 2023 Renewables in Energy Supply Module.)

Fossil fuel power capacity continued to grow during 2022. China approved 106 GW of new coal power capacity in response to electricity shortages during the summer of 2021 that were caused by a historic drought, heatwave, and challenges related to outdated grid management. 96 This was a four-fold increase from 2021 and the highest new coal capacity permitted since 2015. 97 China and India are positioning themselves to continue operating coal power plants, and in India coal generation experienced the largest absolute increase among all sources, rising 7.2% (92 TWh) in 2022. 98 This increase met 74% of the country's growing power demand for the year. 99

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Renewable Energy Manufacturing Capacity and Skilled Workforce

Technology manufacturing capacity and the availability of a skilled workforce are important for meeting existing renewable energy targets. (See GSR 2023 Renewables for Economic & Social Value Creation Module. ) Although certain sectors are on track to achieve or even surpass the capacity needed by 2030 to align with targets for net zero greenhouse gas emissions, other sectors are falling behind and require far greater ambition to meet capacity deployment goals. Data for 2022 show strong growth in solar PV manufacturing capacity, at 39%, but lower growth for wind energy, at 2%. 100 Technologies that enable the integration of renewables also experienced growth in manufacturing capacity, including batteries (72%), electrolysers (26%) and heat pumps (13%). 101

Solar PV manufacturing capacity has gained significant momentum in the last decade, achieving a compound annual growth rate of 25% during 2010-2021; this is estimated to exceed the rate of deployment needed to achieve global net zero targets. 102 However, significant gaps remain for wind energy manufacturing capacity. 103 Manufacturing operations for renewables and enabling technologies are highly concentrated geographically, with China dominating in both manufacturing and trade. Such concentration in global supply chains poses challenges and vulnerabilities, with tight supply chains leading to higher technology prices in recent years, raising the cost of the energy transition. Rising prices of critical minerals such as cobalt, lithium, and nickel have led to higher battery prices, and wind turbine prices also have risen due to higher input costs. 104

In the solar industry, the global manufacturing capacity of polysilicon and other key components such as wafers and modules is projected to increase significantly by 2025, surpassing anticipated demand for solar panels. 105 In the wind sector, price inflation affecting materials (steel, neodymium and copper), as well as disruptions in the shipping sector, caused delays in the delivery of components and materials, and in turbine transport to project sites. 106 As the availability of components improves, prices are expected to decrease.

The renewable energy industry is attempting to strengthen its supply chains through vertical integration, forging long-term partnerships, making targeted acquisitions, collaborating with suppliers to in-source critical components, and expanding existing facilities or creating new ones. For example, Ørsted has partnered with the German steel producer Salzgitter AG to supply hydrogen and zero-carbon electricity for green steel production, reducing the need for additional capacity. 107

The resilience of the supply chain can be jeopardised by supply disruptions and price fluctuations of raw materials. In 2020, China supplied 79% of the world's polysilicon, a crucial material for solar cell wafers. 108 Between 2020 and June 2022, the price of polysilicon increased 350%, driven by disruptions related to COVID-19 lockdowns, factory accidents and floods. 109 However, the growth in available production capacity for polysilicon helped to moderate this trend by late 2022 and early 2023. 110

The wind power sector was similarly impacted by fluctuations in raw material prices. To mitigate future disruptions, wind turbine manufacturers from Europe and North America opted to expand their supply chains to ensure a reliable source of components. 111 India has become the second largest hub in the Asia-Pacific region for turbine assembly and the production of essential components. 112 While most wind industry suppliers are still located in the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, and the United States, new participants have emerged in the Middle East and North Africa. 113

In the United States, the Inflation Reduction Act has supported the diversification of supply chains for clean energy, including helping to scale up domestic battery manufacturing capacity. 114 Between August 2022 and March 2023, 47 manufacturing facilities for utility-scale clean energy were announced in the country (including 27 for solar PV and 10 for wind power). 115 In the EU, the REPowerEU plan was designed with the aim of increasing the regional production of renewable energy from 40% to 45%. 116 India's Production Linked Incentive scheme also aimed to increase the domestic manufacturing capacity of renewable energy and enabling technologies. (See GSR 2023 Renewables in Energy Supply Module.)

The growth of renewables relies on the availability of skilled and experienced employees. In 2021, employment in renewable energy worldwide increased 5.8% to reach 12.7 million. 117 The majority of these jobs (nearly two-thirds) are in Asia, with China alone contributing 42% of the global total. 118 From 2022 to 2030, the global renewable energy sector is projected to require the recruitment of around 1.1 million additional workers in hands-on roles for developing and building wind and solar power plants. 119 An estimated 1.7 million workers will be needed to operate and maintain these plants once they are operational. 120

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Footnotes

i Carbon intensity refers to the amount of emissions released to produce one unit of electricity.

ii In 2022, both India and China experienced significant heatwaves, leading to increased electricity demand, prolonged blackouts and reduced production in some industries.

  1. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Sustainable Energy Hub, “Three Trends That Will Shape the Energy Sector in 2023”, January 12, 2023, https://www.undp.org/energy/blog/three-trends-will-shape-energy-sector-2023; International Energy Agency (IEA), “Global Energy Crisis – Topics”, https://www.iea.org/topics/global-energy-crisis, accessed May 11, 2023. Box 1 from the following sources: IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2022”, 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/830fe099-5530-48f2-a7c1-11f35d510983/WorldEnergyOutlook2022.pdf; IEA, “Global Energy Crisis – Topics”, op. cit. this note; Eurostat, “Electricity & Gas Hit Record Prices in 2022”, April 26, 2023, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/w/ddn-20230426-2.1
  2. IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2022”, op. cit. note 1.2
  3. European Commission, “REPowerEU: Affordable, Secure and Sustainable Energy for Europe”, May 18, 2022, https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/priorities-2019-2024/european-green-deal/repowereu-affordable-secure-and-sustainable-energy-europe_en; US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), “The Inflation Reduction Act”, Overviews and Factsheets, November 21, 2022, https://www.epa.gov/green-power-markets/inflation-reduction-act.3
  4. World Meteorological Organization, “Climate and Weather Extremes in 2022 Show Need for More Action”, December 23, 2022, https://public.wmo.int/en/media/news/climate-and-weather-extremes-2022-show-need-more-action. 4
  5. BP, “Statistical Review of World Energy 2022”, 2022, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf. 5
  6. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), “Maintaining a Clear Intention to Keep 1.5°C Within Reach”, https://unfccc.int/maintaining-a-clear-intention-to-keep-15degc-within-reach, accessed June 28, 2023.6
  7. Ibid.7
  8. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), “COP27 Ends with Announcement of Historic Loss and Damage Fund”, November 22, 2022, https://www.unep.org/news-and-stories/story/cop27-ends-announcement-historic-loss-and-damage-fund. 8
  9. IEA, “Energy Technology Perspectives 2023”, 2023, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/a86b480e-2b03-4e25-bae1-da1395e0b620/EnergyTechnologyPerspectives2023.pdf; US EPA, op. cit. note 3. Box 2 based on the following sources: McKinsey, “Renewable-Energy Development: Disrupted Supply Chains”, February 2023, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/electric-power-and-natural-gas/our-insights/renewable-energy-development-in-a-net-zero-world-disrupted-supply-chains; IEA, “Renewable Energy Market Update – June 2023”, June 2023, https://www.iea.org/reports/renewable-energy-market-update-june-2023; BloombergNEF, “Cost of New Renewables Temporarily Rises as Inflation Starts to Bite”, June 30, 2022, https://about.bnef.com/blog/cost-of-new-renewables-temporarily-rises-as-inflation-starts-to-bite; Energy Transitions Commission, “Streamlining Planning and Permitting to Accelerate Wind and Solar Deployment”, in Barriers to Clean Electrification Series – Planning and Permitting, January 2023, https://www.energy-transitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/Barriers_PlanningAndPermitting_vFinal.pdf; BloombergNEF, “2H 2022 Levelized Cost of Electricity Update”, December 2022, https://about.bnef.com/blog/2h-2022-levelized-cost-of-electricity-update; Wood Mackenzie, “Renewable Power in Asia Pacific Gains Competitiveness Amidst Cost Inflation”, January 2022, https://www.woodmac.com/press-releases/renewable-power-in-asia-pacific-gains-competitiveness-amidst-cost-inflation; J. Saul, W. Mathis and R. Morison, “Planet-Saving Wind Farms Fall Victim to Global Inflation Fight”, Bloomberg, March 10, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-10/offshore-wind-farms-face-fresh-hurdles-around-the-world-because-of-inflation. 9
  10. Figure 1 from IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2021”, 2021, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/4ed140c1-c3f3-4fd9-acae-789a4e14a23c/WorldEnergyOutlook2021.pdf. 10
  11. L. Cozzi et al., “For the First Time in Decades, the Number of People Without Access to Electricity Is Set to Increase in 2022 – Analysis”, IEA, November 3, 2022, https://www.iea.org/commentaries/for-the-first-time-in-decades-the-number-of-people-without-access-to-electricity-is-set-to-increase-in-2022. 11
  12. IEA, “Energy Access – Achieving Modern Energy for All by 2030 Seems Unlikely”, https://www.iea.org/topics/energy-access, accessed May 11, 2023.12
  13. Ibid. 13
  14. Ibid.14
  15. Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21), “Renewables 2023 Global Status Report Collection, Renewables in Energy Supply”, June 2023, https://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/GSR-2023_Energy-Supply-Module.pdf.15
  16. Ibid.16
  17. IEA, “World Energy Balances”, 2022, https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-balances-overview/world.17
  18. Ibid.18
  19. Figure 2 from Ibid.19
  20. Figure 3 from Ibid. 20
  21. Ibid.21
  22. Ibid.22
  23. REN21, op. cit. note 15.23
  24. Ibid.; IEA “Renewable Heat – Renewables 2022 – Analysis”, 2022, https://www.iea.org/reports/renewables-2022/renewable-heat.24
  25. REN21, op. cit. note 15.25
  26. REN21 Policy Database. See Reference Table R3a in the GSR 2023 Renewables in Energy Demand Data Pack, http://www.ren21.net/gsr2023-data-pack. 26
  27. IEA, “CO2 Emissions in 2022 – Analysis”, March 2023, https://www.iea.org/reports/co2-emissions-in-2022.27
  28. Ibid.28
  29. Ibid.29
  30. Ibid.30
  31. Ibid.31
  32. Figure 4 from Ibid.32
  33. M. Wiatros-Motyka, “Global Electricity Review 2023”, Ember, https://ember-climate.org/insights/research/global-electricity-review-2023/#supporting-material. 33
  34. Ibid. Figure 5 from Ember, “Electricity Data Explorer | Open Source Global Electricity Data”, 2023, https://ember-climate.org/data/data-tools/data-explorer.34
  35. Our World in Data, “Carbon Intensity of Electricity”, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/carbon-intensity-electricity, accessed June 27, 2023.35
  36. Ibid.36
  37. REN21, “Renewables 2023 Global Status Report Collection: Renewables in Energy Demand”, March 2023, https://www.ren21.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/GSR2023_Demand_Modules.pdf.37
  38. Ibid.38
  39. International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), “Electrification with Renewables: Driving the Transformation of Energy Services”, 2019, https://www.irena.org/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2019/Jan/IRENA_RE-Electrification_SGCC_2019_preview.pdf. 39
  40. REN21, op. cit. note 15.40
  41. Energy Institute in partnership with KPMG and KEARNEY, “Statistical Review of World Energy 2023, 72nd Edition”, June 2023, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2022-full-report.pdf. 41
  42. “Explained: Why India Is Facing Longest Power Cuts in 6 Years”, Times of India, April 30, 2022, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/explained-why-india-is-facing-longest-power-cuts-in-6-years/articleshow/91198487.cms; Bloomberg, “China's Factories Still Struggling as Power Cuts Curb Output”, August 31, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-31/china-factory-activity-falls-again-as-power-outages-curb-output; S-L. Tan, “China Is Facing Another Power Crunch. But This Time It's Likely to Be Different”, CNBC, August 23, 2022, https://epthinktank.eu/2023/01/12/how-will-increasing-fuel-prices-impact-transport-ten-issues-to-watch-in-2023. 42
  43. REN21, op. cit. note 37.43
  44. IRENA, “World Energy Transitions Outlook 2023”, June 2023, https://mc-cd8320d4-36a1-40ac-83cc-3389-cdn-endpoint.azureedge.net/-/media/Files/IRENA/Agency/Publication/2023/Jun/IRENA_World_energy_transitions_outlook_v_1_2023.pdf; IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2022”, op. cit. note 1.44
  45. Ibid.45
  46. Ibid. 46
  47. REN21, op. cit. note 37.47
  48. REN21, op. cit. note 15.48
  49. Ibid.49
  50. IEA, “Electrification – Analysis”, September 2022, https://www.iea.org/reports/electrification.50
  51. Ibid.51
  52. Ibid.52
  53. “Greenhyscale Has Begun the Installation Process of a 6 MW Prototype Electrolyser in the Danish Green Industrial Park, Greenlab.” Hydrogen Central, April 12, 2023. https://hydrogen-central.com/greenhyscale-begun-installation-process-6-mw-prototype-electrolyser-danish-green-industrial-park-greenlab/ 53
  54. IRENA, “Hydrogen”, https://www.irena.org/Energy-Transition/Technology/Hydrogen, accessed May 21, 2023.54
  55. UNDP Sustainable Energy Hub, op. cit. note 1.55
  56. European Commission, “A Hydrogen Strategy for a Climate-Neutral Europe”, July 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52020DC0301. The EU Hydrogen Strategy consists of the following phases: Phase 1 (2020-2024): Install 6 GW of renewable hydrogen electrolysers and produce up to 1 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen. Scale up electrolyser manufacturing, including large ones up to 100 MW and establish hydrogen refuelling stations for fuel-cell buses and trucks. Retrofit existing hydrogen production plants with carbon capture and storage technologies. Phase 2 (2025-2030): Install 40 GW of renewable hydrogen electrolysers and produce up to 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen. Gradual cost competitiveness of renewable hydrogen. Implement demand side policies for industrial applications, including steel-making, trucks, rail, and maritime transport. Use green hydrogen for balancing a renewables-based electricity system, providing flexibility and storage.56
  57. FleishmanHillard, “National Hydrogen Strategies in the EU Member States”, February 2022, https://fleishmanhillard.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2022/02/FH-National-Hydrogen-Strategies-Report-2022.pdf. The Hydrogen Innovation Scheme is divided into two streams. Stream 1 focuses on funding feasibility studies or technical demonstrations of hydrogen production, distribution, or storage solutions at various Technology Readiness Levels (TRL 3 to 7). Stream 2 provides support for the development of test and demonstration facilities and equipment within Scotland. See also Scottish Government, “Emerging Energy Technologies Fund – Hydrogen Innovation Scheme: Form and Guidance”, October 21, 2022, http://www.gov.scot/publications/emerging-energy-technologies-fund-hydrogen-innovation-scheme-form-and-guidance. 57
  58. Energy Transitions Commission, op. cit. note 9.58
  59. Ibid.59
  60. Ibid.60
  61. IEA, “Renewable Energy Market Update – June 2023”, op. cit. note 9.61
  62. Energy Transitions Commission, op. cit. note 9.62
  63. IEA, “Renewable Energy Market Update – June 2023”, op. cit. note 9.63
  64. Ibid.64
  65. Ibid.65
  66. Energy Transitions Commission, op. cit. note 9.66
  67. Ibid.67
  68. Ibid.68
  69. Ibid.69
  70. Ibid.70
  71. Global Wind Energy Council, 2022, "India Wind Power Market Outlook, 2022-2026", https://gwec.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/
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  72. S. Mojib Zahraee, N. Shiwakoti and P. Stasinopoulos, “Agricultural Biomass Supply Chain Resilience: COVID-19 Outbreak vs. Sustainability Compliance, Technological Change, Uncertainties, and Policies”, Cleaner Logistics and Supply Chain, Vol. 4 (July 2022), p. 100049, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.clscn.2022.100049.72
  73. OECD, “Supply of Critical Raw Materials Risks Jeopardising the Green Transition”, April 2023, https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/supply-of-critical-raw-materials-risks-jeopardising-the-green-transition.htm. 73
  74. IEA, “Renewable Energy Market Update – June 2023”, op. cit. note 9.74
  75. C40, “How to win support for local clean energy”, September 2021, https://www.c40knowledgehub.org/s/article/How-to-win-
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  76. Ibid.76
  77. B.K. Sovacool et al., “Conflicted Transitions: Exploring the Actors, Tactics and Outcomes of Social Opposition Against Energy Infrastructure”, Global Environmental Change, Vol. 73, (March 2022), p. 102473, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2022.102473.77
  78. BP, op. cit. note 5; Energy Institute in partnership with KPMG and KEARNEY, op. cit. note 41; Ember, op. cit. note 34.78
  79. BP, op. cit. note 5; Ember, op. cit. note 34.79
  80. Energy Institute in partnership with KPMG and KEARNEY, op. cit. note 41.80
  81. BP, op. cit. note 5.81
  82. Energy Institute in partnership with KPMG and KEARNEY, op. cit. note 41. 82
  83. Ibid.83
  84. Ember, op. cit. note 34.84
  85. Wiatros-Motyka, op. cit. note 33.85
  86. Sidebar 1 from the following sources: BloombergNEF, “Tech Firms Seal US Dominance in Corporate Clean Power Purchasing”, March 17, 2023, https://about.bnef.com/blog/tech-firms-seal-us-dominance-in-corporate-clean-power-purchasing; American Clean Power (ACP), "Clean Energy Investing in America", 2023, https://cleanpower.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/CleanEnergy_ImpactReport_230505.pdf. Figure 6 from BloombergNEF, “Corporations Brush Aside Energy Crisis, Buy Record Clean Power”, February 9, 2023, https://about.bnef.com/blog/corporations-brush-aside-energy-crisis-buy-record-clean-power.86
  87. Ember, op. cit. note 34.87
  88. Energy Institute in partnership with KPMG and KEARNEY, op. cit. note 41.88
  89. REN21, op. cit. note 15.89
  90. Deloitte, “2023 Renewable Energy Industry Outlook”, 2023, https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/energy-resources/us-eri-renewable-energy-outlook-2023.pdf; Anadolu Ajansı, “Renewables Set to Break New Record in 2022 Despite Supply Chain Challenges”, May 11, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/renewables-set-to-break-new-record-in-2022-despite-supply-chain-challenges/2584641. 90
  91. Ibid.91
  92. Ibid.92
  93. Ibid.93
  94. Ibid.94
  95. REN21, op. cit. note 15.95
  96. Wiatros-Motyka, op. cit. note 33; Global Energy Monitor, “China Permits Two New Coal Power Plants per Week in 2022”, February 26, 2023, https://globalenergymonitor.org/press-release/china-permits-two-new-coal-power-plants-per-week-in-2022. 96
  97. Ibid. 97
  98. Ibid. 98
  99. Ibid.99
  100. IEA, “The State of Clean Technology Manufacturing. An Energy Technology Perspectives Special Briefing”, 2023, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/baa765ac-27c7-42ba-9eba-73717359de23/TheStateofCleanTechnologyManufacturing.pdf. 100
  101. Ibid.101
  102. Ibid.102
  103. Ibid.103
  104. IEA, “Energy Technology Perspectives 2023”, op. cit. note 9.104
  105. IEA, op. cit. note 100.105
  106. Energy Transitions Commission, op. cit. note 9.106
  107. McKinsey, op. cit. note 9.107
  108. IEA, op. cit. note 100.108
  109. McKinsey, op. cit. note 9.109
  110. Eco Green Energy, “PV Industry Price Trends”, April 2023, https://www.eco-greenenergy.com/pv-industry-price-trends-april-2023.110
  111. Global Wind Energy Council, “Global Wind Report 2023”, 2023, https://gwec.net/globalwindreport2023. 111
  112. Ibid.112
  113. Ibid.113
  114. op. cit. note 100. 114
  115. Ibid.115
  116. Ibid.116
  117. IRENA, “Renewable Energy and Jobs: Annual Review 2022”, September 2022, https://www.irena.org/publications/2022/Sep/Renewable-Energy-and-Jobs-Annual-Review-2022.117
  118. Ibid.118
  119. McKinsey, “Renewable Development: Overcoming Talent Gaps”, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/electric-power-andnatural-gas/our-insights/renewable-energy-development-in-anet-zero-world-overcoming-talent-gaps, accessed June 30, 2023.119
  120. Ibid.120
  121. Figure 7 from REN21 Policy Database. See GSR 2023 Data Pack, available at www.ren21.net/gsr2023-data-pack/go.121
  122. REN21 Policy Database. See GSR 2023 Data Pack, available at www.ren21.net/gsr2023-data-pack/go.122
  123. Ibid.123
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  125. European Parliament, “Renewable Energy Directive – Amendments Adopted in Sept 2022”, September 14, 2022, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0317_EN.pdf.125
  126. R. Lowes et al., “A Policy Toolkit for Global Mass Heat Pump
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  127. Chinese Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, “14th Five-Year' Building Energy Efficiency and Green Building Development Plan”, 2021, https://www-mohurd-gov-cn.translate.goog/gongkai/fdzdgknr/zfhcxjsbwj/202203/20220311_765109.html. 127
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  129. Ibid.129
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  132. International Air Transport Association, “Fact Sheet: EU and US Policy Approaches to Advance SAF Production”, 2021, https://www.iata.org/contentassets/d13875e9ed784f75bac90f000760e998/fact-sheet---us-and-eusaf-policies.pdf. 132
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  135. Ibid.135
  136. IEA, “World Energy Outlook 2022 Shows the Global Energy Crisis Can Be a Historic Turning Point Towards a Cleaner and More Secure Future”, October 27, 2022, https://www.iea.org/news/world-energy-outlook-2022-shows-the-global-energy-crisis-can-be-a-historic-turning-point-towards-a-cleaner-and-more-secure-future. 136
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  147. Ibid.147
  148. IEA, “Carbon Neutrality and Green Growth Act for the Climate Change”, 8 November 2021, https://www.iea.org/policies/14212-carbon-neutrality-and-green-growth-act-for-the-climate-change. 148
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  152. Ibid.152
  153. Ibid.153
  154. Ibid.154
  155. Ibid.155
  156. Ibid.156
  157. European Commission, “Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism”, https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/green-taxation-0/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en, accessed May 2, 2023.157
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  159. Ibid. 159
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  165. Ibid.165
  166. Ibid.166
  167. Ibid.167
  168. Ibid.168
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  222. Ibid.222
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  227. Ibid.227
  228. Harrison, op. cit. note 224.228
  229. Ibid.229
  230. OECD, “ESG Investing and Climate Transition, Market Practices, Issues and Policy Considerations: OECD Business and Finance Outlook, 6th edition”, 2020, https://doi.org/10.1787/eb61fd29-en.230
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  237. OECD, op. cit. note 230.237